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Rapid decentralization since 1992 has left Russia’s 88 regions with substantial 
control over their own revenues as well as significant expenditure 
responsibility, particularly in the social sphere. These regions are highly 
diverse in climate, in natural resources and in economic development, making 
some much better equipped than others to adjust to market conditions. The 
combination of diversity and decentralization makes a strong and effective 
system of intergovernmental transfers essential if regions hardest hit by 
transition are to continue to provide adequate standards of key social goods.
In this paper I examine the transfer system that has developed in Russia since 
1992. I ask how far transfers have been directed to regions most in need of 
them, and how effective they have been in offsetting disparities in pre-transfer 
revenues. The main results are that the direction of transfers has been 
essentially equalizing over the period, but that transfers have been too small in 
size and too thinly spread to have made a substantial impact.






















































































































































































The transition from command economy to the market has entailed the 
rapid decentralization of fiscal decision-making in countries across 
Central and Eastern Europe, as central governments try to lighten their 
own fiscal burden while simultaneously responding to the demands of 
economic efficiency and local autonomy. The Russian Federation has 
been no exception. Since 1992, its 88 regions (oblasts) have been 
responsible for a growing proportion of budgetary expenditure.1 At the 
same time, the system of revenue allocation has been overhauled, giving 
the oblast real control for the first time over revenue collected locally. By 
1994 almost half of all budgetary expenditure in Russia was spent at the 
oblast level or below, in comparison to about 40% of total expenditure in 
the USA spent at state level in the early 1980s. Decentralization of 
funding of the social sphere has been even greater: about 90% of health 
care expenditure and 80% of education expenditure is now a sub-national 
responsibility.
In all transition countries the decentralization process has raised a series 
of issues, but Russia's size and diversity make it somewhat unique. 
Geographically the largest country in the world, it contains some of the 
world's most valuable resources: 20% of the world's oil, 15% of its coal 
and 25% of its diamonds come from Russian soil, as well a wealth of 
other minerals and precious metals; much of this wealth is concentrated in 
a handful of regions in Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, large 
areas of the country are made uninhabitable or close to uninhabitable by 
climate and terrain, while a long history of uneven industrial 
development, concentrated in the European regions and the Urals, has 
added an extra element to the natural pattern of diversity. These factors 
combined create a heritage which has left oblasts facing transition with 
very different economic endowments. Naturally, some of them have been 
able to benefit more than others from market reforms such as the 
liberalization of prices and the lifting of barriers to trade.
■The Russian Federation as it stood at the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 was 
composed in theory of 89 economic units, but in practice Chechenya has never been a 
participating member. Neighbouring Ingushetia is also excluded from the analysis 
below due to a lack of data. Of the remaining 87 units, only 49 officially have the 
Russian title 'oblast' (there are also 19 republics, 11 autonomous oblasts, 2 
metropolitan cities and 6 krai), but I follow convention in using the term generically. 
The 11 autonomous oblasts are actually sub-units within larger oblasts; data for these 




























































































Fiscal decentralization in a context of such inherent regional differences 
demands a powerful system of intergovernmental transfers if disparities in 
economic strength are not simply to feed through into disparities in social 
income, with obvious implications for the provision of vital social goods 
such as health and education. Overlooked in the initial restructuring of the 
fiscal system, in practice such transfers have taken place in Russia since 
1992. Originally allocated according to non-transparent criteria in closed- 
door negotiations, since 1994 their allocation has been determined by a 
formula mechanism.
It is not immediately clear however that either negotiations or formula 
have resulted in the targeting of transfers to the regions most in need of 
them. A number of recent studies have pointed to a series of problems. 
(See Bahl et al. (1993), Le Houerou (1994), Wallich (1994), Kirkow 
(1996) and in the Russian literature Boiko and Lavrov (1995), Lavrov
(1995) and Ptitsin (1996).) They have highlighted in particular the degree 
to which some transfers continued to be allocated behind closed doors 
even after 1994, the inappropriate criteria chosen for the formula, and the 
fact that a number of (wealthier) regions have been allowed to negotiate 
their own more favourable terms with the centre with obvious 
implications for would-be recipient regions. Some have pointed to the 
high numbers of regions receiving formula-based transfers as an indicator 
of an inadequate degree of targeting in the system (Lavrov (1995b)), 
while others have claimed that particular groups do well more because of 
political status than economic need. Solnick (1995), for instance, is 
among several who claim that regions with republic status do better than 
others.2
However, very few studies have examined in detail the characteristics of 
the regions which do receive funds and attempted to quantify how far 
transfer receipts can indeed be explained by factors other than regional 
needs. Using data for 1992, Treisman (1995) discovers political muscle to 
have been important in allocation and regional needs not, while McAuley
(1996) finds a significant role for needs variables in the 1995 data. This 
apparent change in allocation over time is interesting but the two studies 
use different methodology and the results cannot be compared. No study 
appears to have looked at the pattern of distribution in more than one 
year.
2The fact that a number of regions pressed for republic status between 1993 and 1995 




























































































Thus while the current provisions for transfer allocation are generally 
perceived to be unfair, the debate is not explicit about the degree to which 
they are unfair, which regions are suffering, and in particular about 
whether recent developments have improved the allocation or rather made 
it worse. In this paper I try to address these issues. I ask how far 
intergovernmental transfers since 1992 have gone to those oblasts that 
need them, and how far, in contrast, their allocation can be explained by 
alternative factors such as regional influence and negotiating power. I 
concentrate on one category of transfer, those intended to be equalizing, 
ignoring for the present other grants made with alternative goals in mind. 
Where relevant, I include in this category variation in the share of VAT 
retained in the region, as this was used in some years as an equalizing 
tool. I look at each year between 1993 and 1995 separately to allow for a 
possible change in the pattern of distribution over the period; and in 
particular in 1994 after the introduction of the formula-based allocation 
system.
The paper follows the following outline. I begin with a brief overview of 
the theory behind intergovernmental transfers, outlining their purpose and 
ideal design. I go on to describe the Russian fiscal system as it has 
developed since 1992, and especially — with the theoretical ideal in mind 
— the existing mechanisms for intergovernmental transfers. I then present 
some graphical analysis of own-revenues and transfers to give a 
preliminary overview of how far the latter have helped to even out 
disparities in the former. This raises a series of questions for which 
multivariate analysis is required. In Section 5 I set up two hypotheses to 
be tested, describe the econometric framework and introduce the 




























































































2. Intergovernmental transfers in principle: purpose and 
design
Transfers of revenue from one level of government to another serve a 
series of purposes in states with even a small degree of regional 
autonomy (see e.g. Oates (1972), Chapter 3). First, they are used by 
central governments as a way of encouraging regional expenditure on 
particular goods, either because they have positive externalities for other 
regions (e.g. health care, education), or because they are seen by the 
centre as merit goods (again education is a good example).
Second, they are used to iron out imbalances of two types in the fiscal 
system. The first type has been referred to as 'fiscal gap' or 'vertical 
imbalance': a mismatch between the expenditure and revenue
responsibilities allocated to each level of government in aggregate. If 
regional governments are responsible for 40% of expenditure but only 
gather 30% of revenue on the taxes allocated to them, transfers from 
central to regional level will be in order. Vertical imbalance may occur as 
a result of deliberate policy because central government is seen as most 
efficient at tax-raising even if local government is best placed to make or 
implement decisions, or it may occur because of lack of foresight in the 
design of the fiscal system.
The second type of imbalance is sometimes called 'horizontal imbalance', 
or more frequently, 'horizontal inequity' (Buchanan (1950)). Where 
revenues raised per capita vary across regions an individual living in a 
poorer region will have to pay a higher proportion of income for the same 
level of service as an identical individual earning exactly the same in a 
richer region. This contradicts what has been described as 'perhaps the 
most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation': that 'people in equal 
positions should be treated equally' (Musgrave (1959), p.160). Transfers 
of revenues across regions are needed to iron this inequality out. Where 
regional income disparities are large, the implications of the inequity 
become more serious: not only will poorer regions have to tax individuals 
more heavily, they may find themselves unable to provide public services 
to an adequate level on the strength of their own tax base.
It is this last category of transfers that I am concerned with here, those 
intended to equalize revenues horizontally across regions. How should 
such transfers be designed? While grants intended to encourage 
expenditure on particular goods clearly need to be ear-marked for those 




























































































imbalance of either type (vertical or horizontal) should be unconditional 
and lump-sum so as not to compromise local autonomy (Oates, op.cit.).3 
However, while unconditional grants to cover general 'fiscal gap' would 
probably be identical (per capita) to all regions, equalizing grants clearly 
need to be targeted to those regions most in need.
Regional 'need' in this context has two main components: poor fiscal 
capacity and high pressure on regional services, where the latter itself 
comprises two key elements — size of demand and the unit cost of 
provision. The challenge in designing a system of equalizing transfers is 
to account for each of these factors where it is beyond the control of the 
authorities but not otherwise. Thus regions with low revenue resulting 
from a small revenue base are needy while those with low revenue 
resulting from weak tax effort are not. Similarly, regions which face high 
unit costs due to scattered populations or high transport costs are needy 
while those spending inefficiently, or choosing to provide a higher 
standard of service than is seen as adequate, are not.
Every country with any degree of local fiscal autonomy has faced the 
problem of how to ensure that equalizing intergovernmental grants really 
go to those regions most in need. The simplest approach has been to 
avoid the problem of distinguishing factors under authority control from 
those beyond their control by giving the authority the benefit of the doubt. 
Thus in India, for example, the approach has essentially been a 'gap­
filling' one: with some modifications, actual revenues and actual 
expenditures are taken as the measures of fiscal capacity and expenditure 
need; transfers are designed to make up part or all of the difference (see 
Rao and Sen (1995), especially p.22). Elsewhere, as in Denmark, highly 
complex formulae have been developed which attempt to include all the 
main factors affecting needs directly — numbers of children of different 
ages, numbers of elderly, kilometres of road (Lotz (1981)). It should be 
noted however that to an extent all transfer mechanisms are still 
developing, as is evidenced by the OECD Workshop in 1981 on 
'Measuring Local Government Expenditure Needs', which aimed to 
'stimulate research and development work on the subject ... (and thereby 
to) improve the resource allocation process' (OECD (1981), p.6). The best 
design of a system of intergovernmental transfers remains an ongoing 
issue even in countries with well established federal structures.
3This is true unless of course equity is sought not in a general package of public goods 
but only in certain specific ones, in which case conditional grants could be more 




























































































3. Intergovernmental transfers in the Russian fiscal system
3.1 The need for transfers
In Russia the question of intergovernmental transfers is a new one, as in 
the Soviet era both expenditure and funding decisions were highly 
centralized. Although in principle many responsibilities were delegated to 
lower levels of government, including almost all health care and all pre­
university education, in practice the degree of autonomy was limited. 
Minimum levels of service provision and maximum levels of expenditure 
were enforced from above, with the budget of each government level 
supervised by the next level up and any surpluses automatically extracted 
at the end of each fiscal year. While this deprived local authorities of any 
real control, it did ensure that any disparities in oblast expenditure were 
the result of central decision-making, not of regional economic inequality.
Since 1992, oblast responsibilities have become much more substantive, 
while the relative size of the oblasts' burden has increased considerably. 
More expenditure responsibilities have been delegated to the local level 
from the centre (income maintenance programmes and some capital 
expenditure), while many responsibilities previously handled by local 
enterprises (kindergartens and polyclinics) have been divested to local 
authorities. Table 1 gives an indication of the extent to which the role of 
the oblast increased between 1992 and 1994.
Table 1: Sub-national level budgetary expenditure as a percentage of total
1992 1994
I Total Expenditures 36 49
National Economy 47 71
Social Expenditures 62 81
Education 66 80
Health 89 88
Social Protection 25 66
Culture 49 64
Source: Ministry of Finance data. 'National Economy' includes capital investment, subsidies 
to industry and housing subsidies. All figures are exclusive of 'extra-budgetary' expenditure, 
meaning that the Social Protection category does not include pensions, maternity benefit, 
health insurance or unemployment benefit and insurance. All of these are paid from 
centralized extra-budgetary funds financed from payroll taxes.
As a point of comparison, 37% of total expenditure in the USA in 1982 
came from state level or below, roughly equivalent to the situation in 
Russia in 1992 (Glendening and Mann Reeves (1984), p.228). By 1994 




























































































responsibility of the oblast or sub-oblast level. The oblast role is 
particularly important where social expenditures are concerned: over 80% 
of social expenditure now comes from sub-national government.
What really increased oblast autonomy however was the passage of the 
Law on the Basic Principles of Taxation in January 1992, which gave 
oblasts real control for the first time over the resources allocated to them. 
The revenues from each tax was to be assigned to a particular level of 
government. Revenues from Personal Income Tax (PIT), Corporate 
Income Tax (CIT) and 21 additional minor taxes were assigned to the 
oblast while Value Added Tax (VAT), all taxes on foreign trade and 
international transactions and all energy excise duties were to go the 
centre. Once allocated, these revenues were to remain the property of the 
relevant government level. Budget surpluses would no longer be 
appropriated by higher level authorities.
Naturally, the reverse side of this was that budget deficits would no longer 
be automatically covered, and this highlights the major flaw in the system 
as initially designed. Oblasts were faced with growing expenditure 
responsibilities on the one hand and real control over the funds raised 
through assigned taxes on the other, but the decentralization of expenditure 
responsibilities was carried out quite separately from the design of the 
revenue-assignment system, and there was no reason to expect one to 
cover the other — either at the aggregate level (to ensure vertical balance) 
or at the level of the individual region (to ensure horizontal equity). The 
problem of vertical imbalance was exacerbated by the fact that all tax rates 
continued to be set at the centre, preventing oblasts from adjusting tax 
rates and bands to suit their own requirements. This ensured that 
individuals faced identical tax rates regardless of where they lived, but 
they would face widely differing qualities of service: wealthier regions 
would automatically retain more revenue per capita than poorer regions. In 
1993, for instance, the top 10 regions raised on average nine times as 
much per capita as the bottom 10.
3.2 The design of the transfer mechanism
Although no initial provision was made to deal with either of these 
problems, in practice mechanisms were developed to address both. To 
deal with vertical imbalance, adjustments were made to the original tax 
share rates, most notably with respect to VAT. In the original system, all 




























































































government; in practice this never happened and VAT revenues have been 
partially retained by the region since 1992. For the last three quarters of 
1992 the region's share was fixed for all regions at 20%, in 1993 retention 
rates were negotiated individually with each region, and in 1994 a uniform 
rate was fixed at 25%. In practice however even these rates were not 
adhered to: retention rates have varied across regions in all periods. The 
motivation for this could have been to address both vertical and horizontal 
imbalance simultaneously, or alternatively it could simply have been the 
result of preferential treatment enjoyed by politically important or powerful 
regions. I return to this below.
A second measure which has arguably been used as a means of addressing 
vertical imbalance is the making of transfers under the umbrella heading of 
'mutual settlements'. In principle these represent the net balance of a range 
of intergovernmental transactions and could flow either way (to or from 
the centre); in practice every region has always been a net recipient. The 
settlements cover expenses which are federal responsibilities but given to 
regions to carry out, and also compensation for central decisions which 
lead either to a loss in income on the part of regional budgets (due to 
changes in tax rates) or to growth in regional expenditures (due for 
example to a rise in the minimum pension or the minimum wage) 
(Bogacheva (1995), p.37). As such their role does seem to be to counter 
vertical imbalance, although it is not clear how effective they are; their 
lack of transparency and the fact that have no foundation in budgetary law 
has left them open to charges of arbitrariness and subjectivity (see e.g. 
Lavrov (1995), p.31).
My concern here however is with the mechanisms introduced to deal with 
questions of horizontal imbalance, or interregional inequality. Despite the 
fact that no provision was made for them in the original budget laws, 
subventions, or transfers intended to support oblasts too weak to finance 
their expenditure responsibilities, have in practice been made in Russia 
since 1992. Until 1994, their distribution was determined in closed door 
negotiations, and there was no obvious logic to the process. In 1994 
however an attempt was made to rationalize their allocation and make it 
transparent, with the establishment of the Federal Fund for Financial 
Support (FFFS). The Fund, which was initially assigned 22% of all VAT 
revenues, is allocated to regions needing 'some support' and regions 




























































































below average per capita revenues in a base year (initially 1993) are 
classified as in need of 'some support1; those that would have had difficulty 
in meeting their expenditure requirements even after the first round of 
subventions are classified as in need of 'considerable support'. The amount 
allocated to each region in the first category depends on the degree to 
which they fall below the average per capita revenue level, but is also 
positively related to average per capita expenditures in the wider area in 
which the region is located.4 The amount allocated to regions qualifying in 
the second category is simply a function of the size of their budget deficit 
(again in the base year), i.e. the degree to which their expenditures would 
have exceeded their revenues without this second round of transfers. The 
formula remained unchanged in 1995, although the Fund was increased to 
27% of VAT revenues. The formula is laid out in full in Appendix 1.
How does this system square with the demands of theory? As noted in 
Section 2, an equalizing transfer system needs to take account of two 
factors: the revenue-raising capability of the system, and the demand on 
the region's services, where this covers both the size of the relevant 
population affected and the cost of providing these services where this is 
beyond the authorities' control.
As the proxy for revenue-raising capability the Russian formula takes the 
actual sum of revenues raised per capita in a base year (1993). The 
obvious problem with this is that it favours regions which have low 
revenues because they are less rigorous about tax collection, or because 
they channel money into 'extra-budgetary funds' (EBFs); funds set up for 
specific purposes and not included in the budget.5 The distinction between 
revenues raised and revenue-raising capacity is likely to be important; 
however, where economic strengths differ significantly across regions, it is
4The 88 oblasts are grouped into 11 'economic areas': North, North-West, Central, 
Volgo-Vyatskiy, Black Earth, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern 
Siberia and the Far East. The classification is essentially descriptive and has little 
operational significance.
5There are four main federal EBFs which are funded through a compulsory payroll tax 
(the Pension Fund, the Employment Fund, the Medical Insurance Fund and the Social 
Insurance Fund), but I refer here to the smaller EBFs set up at oblast level. These are 
typically funded through 'voluntary contributions', but it is not implausible that local 
authorities and local enterprises might reach some agreement on contributions.The 
number of oblast level EBFs have multiplied since 1992, but their importance is hard to 




























































































plausible that per capita revenues raised would serve as a rough proxy for 
the latter.
Potentially more problematic is the use of actual expenditures in the base 
year to proxy both aspects of pressure on regional budgets — size of 
demand and cost of service provision. The advantage of this approach is 
clear: it is simple and transparent, avoiding the complications of a formula 
based on a long series of indicators representing pressure on public 
services and cost of provision. It is particularly useful in a country where 
provision costs vary enormously across regions due to transportation costs, 
climate and compensating wage differentials for workers in less 
inhabitable parts of the country.6 But the problems are equally obvious: it 
rewards cost inefficiency in expenditure, and it preserves the status quo, 
allowing regions with high expenditure levels to continue spending high, 
while penalizing regions with low expenditure levels in the base year, even 
where this has been due to financial constraint. In the first round of the 
formula allocation some attempt is made to control for these effects: grants 
to regions qualifying as in need of 'some support1 are weighted not by own 
expenditure levels but by the average in the surrounding area. But this in 
itself has been criticized on the grounds that economic areas are far from 
homogenous with respect to the important variables, cost in particular 
(Lavrov (1995), p.32). In any case, it is the region's own per capita 
expenditures that are the relevant factor in the second round.
The essential question here is whether past levels of expenditure really 
reflect cost and demand differentials for service provision, or alternatively 
relative privilege. In the first case use of actual expenditure as a proxy for 
expenditure needs is justified; in the second case the formula appears to 
bias allocation towards relatively well-off oblasts. If this were so it could 
be argued that the choice of this proxy was itself influenced by more 
powerful regional authorities eager to protect their own position. This 
forms part of the question I hope to get to the bottom of below.
6The coefficient of variation for the price of a basket of staples in December 1994 was 
about 0.3, compared with a similar coefficient of 0.07 for another large federation, 
Canada, in 1991 (De Masi and Koen (1995)). This is in part the result of transportation 
and delivery costs; variation in costs of provision of public services ought to be yet 




























































































3.3 The transfer mechanism in practice
Up to this point I have been concerned with the transfer system as it was 
designed. Several additional issues arise when we turn to look at how it 
has worked in practice. First, it seems that some two thirds of the FFFS in 
1994 (and about one fourth in 1995) was allocated indirectly through 
additional variation in the VAT retention share. It will be recalled that the 
oblast's share of VAT receipts was theoretically fixed at a uniform rate of 
25% in 1994 but that in practice the proportion retained varied widely. 
This appears to have been the result of oblast bargaining to retain an 
additional share of VAT to cover part or all of their allocated share of the 
Fund, rather than sending the VAT to the centre and then waiting for 
transfers to be made in return.7 As the Fund's resources came from VAT 
revenues, there was a certain logic to this process. Certainly regions which 
succeeded in following it benefited: in a context of high inflation any time 
lost waiting for non-indexed sums is expensive. Transfers are in principle 
made quarterly, but in addition there are often delays.8 Quarterly inflation 
rates have been as high as 50% over the period; a three month waiting 
period might thus result in a region losing one third of the real value of its 
allocation.
The implications of this for the analysis below are two-fold. First and 
obvious, variations in VAT retention rates over and above the uniform 
25% need to be included as part of the region's receipt of transfers from 
the Fund. And second, given that a region may benefit substantially from 
retaining extra VAT rather than waiting for transfers, we might want to ask 
which were the regions which managed to do this. It seems plausible that 
the successful regions would have been those able to pull the most weight, 
but an alternative (if unlikely) hypothesis would be that VAT retentions 
were used to give immediate assistance to oblasts really in need. A further 
question is whether the formula was really fully adhered to in practice, 
whether through direct transfers or VAT retentions. There is some 
evidence that in fact actual shares varied from the shares dictated by the 
formula (see Lavrov (1994)) but the formula is so designed that it is close 
to impossible to work out exactly what each region should have received
7That this is the explanation of much of the variation in VAT retentions and of the fact 
that direct transfers from the FFFS total far below 22% of VAT revenue is suggested 
by the data, and is supported by analysis in Lavrov (1995).
8Ptitsin (1996), Minister of Finance for the Sakha Republic, claims two to three 




























































































(see Appendix 1). For the purposes of this paper I stick to analysis of 
transfers actually received, whether or not these were fully provided for in 
the formula.
A second issue is that some regions have simply refused to follow the rules 
as laid down and have imposed their own unilaterally determined tax 
retention rates. Four regions in particular withheld all or almost all their 
revenues from the centre in both 1993 and 1994 — Karelia, Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia); Sakha continued to hold onto 100% 
of taxes raised through 1995. Clearly in a data set on transfers and VAT 
retentions these regions will show up as what they are -- extreme 
beneficiaries, with VAT retentions of close to 100%. Thus if we control 
for the special status accorded them they need not bias the analysis below.
More problematic are the numerous regions (19 in total) which followed 
the example of the above four in withholding revenues in 1993, but whose 
demands were met less favourably by the centre. While the four regions 
listed had special regimes legitimized in bilateral agreements by the end of 
the year, all others faced 'strongly worded threats of sanctions' which had 
led them to comply in full by the end of the year (Birkenes (1997), p.2/3). 
The problem is that taxes should in principle be transferred quarterly, so 
by holding out until the end of the year regions in fact made a substantial 
gain, given the high rate of inflation and the fact that back payments were 
not indexed. Naturally however this gain does not show up in annual 
budget figures: these regions appear to have transferred roughly the same 
share of profit and income taxes as all other regions. Unfortunately in the 
absence of quarterly retention data there is not much that can be done 
about this problem and I am forced to ignore the probable benefits enjoyed 
by these recalcitrant regions.
A final point worthy of note is the large sum received annually by 
Moscow. In 1993 in particular Moscow received a 'subvention' from the 
federal government roughly the same size as all direct grants made from 
the FFFS; in later years the amount was much smaller with respect to other 
transfers but still substantial. These subventions are made under a special 
article of the budget law which provides for additional support to Moscow 
to cover expenses arising from its role as capital. I exclude these transfers 
from the analysis below on the grounds that we know (up to a certain 




























































































transparency to how much it receives, the process is presumably somewhat 
unique, not to be confused with the process determining other transfers.
To summarize this section, there are two key reasons to expect that 
allocation of 'equalizing' transfers may not have been ideal even after the 
introduction of the formula mechanism. First, the terms of the formula 
show a 'gap-filling' approach in which actual revenues represent revenue 
raising potential and actual expenditures expenditure needs: these may or 
may not be reliable proxies. Second, transfers appear to have been partly 
distributed through variations in the VAT retention rate, which may have 
been to the benefit of regions able to exercise influence over the centre. I 
now turn to look at the allocation of these transfers in practice. In the next 
section I present an overview of the data, before going on in Section 5 to 
outline the hypotheses I wish to test and to introduce the analytical 
framework.
4. A preliminary look at the data
Turning to look at the actual allocation of transfers there are two 
immediate questions. First, how large are transfers as a share of total 
oblast revenues? Second, do they appear to have been equalizing? The 
proportion of oblast revenues comprised of all types of intergovernmental 
transfer taken together has varied considerably since 1992, rising steadily 
to reach almost 24% of oblast revenues by 1994, and then dropping by 
almost half between 1994 and 1995. The 1994 level is roughly equivalent 
to the share of federal grants in state and local government expenditure in 
the US in 1980 (Rich (1989), p.193), but the 1995 level is low by most 
international standards. The OECD average for intergovernmental grants 
as a share of consolidated budget expenditure is about 14% (Le Houerou 
(1994), p. 15); the 1995 level for Russia corresponds to just 6-7% of the 
Russian consolidated budget.
Furthermore, transfers from 'equalization funds' are themselves only a 
proportion of the total sum of transfers made, as illustrated in Table 2, 
which gives the trend in the size of different types of transfers over time. 
The table demands some explanation. 'Subvention' was the term given to 
transfers apparently used for equalization in 1992 and 1993; they 
disappeared with the introduction of the FFFS. 'Subventions to Moscow' 
mean the special provision made for Moscow as capital. 'Extra VAT 
retentions' are counted as any VAT retained over and above 30%; the 




























































































prevent regions moving from the category of 'transfer receiving' to the 
category of 'non-transfer receiving' simply as a result of calculating 
differences. As noted, there is evidence that extra VAT retentions were 
used as a means of distributing equalization transfers after 1994; I include 
them as 'equalizing' for 1993 as well for comparison purposes and also 
because it is plausible that their function would not have changed from 
one year to the next.
As Table 2 illustrates, transfers from 'equalization funds' were dwarfed in 
1993 and 1994 by transfers made as 'mutual settlements'. By 1994 
equalizing transfers formed only one third of total transfers made.
The picture given for 1995 however is more promising, despite the fall in 
the share of total transfers in oblast revenues. With the expansion of the 
size of the FFFS in 1995 equalization funds grew substantially, while 
mutual settlements shrunk, perhaps reflecting a clearer distribution of 
responsibilities between government levels as the fiscal system settles 
down. By 1995 equalization transfers formed three quarters of total 
transfers made. Concentrating on the distribution of equalizing transfers 
at the expense of mutual settlements, as is done in this paper, might seem 
odd in the 1992-94 context. But the fact that this type of transfer appears 
to be growing in importance, while mutual settlements may have been 
simply an adjustment mechanism, justifies the decision. Even if they are 
still relatively small, if equalizing transfers are going to the regions most 
in need then the system is moving in the right direction.
Table 2. Intergovernmental transfers as a percentage of total oblast 
revenues 1992-95 ____________________________________
1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Federal Transfers 11.9 19.8 23.4 12.4
'Equalization funds' 5.4 8.3 8.0 9.2
inch Subventions 5.4 2.7
Subventions to Moscow 1.0 2.3 0.8
Transfers from FFFS 2.0 6.1
Extra VAT retentions 4.5 3.7 2.3
I 'Mutual settlements' 5.9 11.4 14.8 2.9
1 Other(subsidies,short-term loans) 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4
Sources: Ministry of Finance data, author's calculations. 1992 and 1993 data (with the 
exception of VAT retention data) are published in World Bank (1995). 'Extra VAT retentions' 




























































































But what can we say about the distribution of these transfers? To give a 
preliminary picture, Figures 1 to 3 (reproduced at the back) show Lorenz 
curves for own revenue retentions and concentration curves for additional 
VAT retentions and direct transfers. This is a one-sided way of 
approaching the question: as already highlighted there are many other 
components of regional need than revenues. However, the figures are still 
an illustrative way of showing distribution of funds with respect to one key 
variable.9
The figures are drawn for the distribution of total population, where each 
individual is treated as a 'recipient' of the average per capita revenue or 
transfer level in the region in which they live. All individuals from the 
same region will hence be identical and rank next to each other, while the 
proportion of x-axis space representing each region will depend on the 
region's population size. The distribution of own revenues per capita prior 
to any transfers is represented as a classic Lorenz curve: the x-axis shows 
the cumulative proportion of the population ranked from poorest to richest 
in terms of the per capita revenue level in their oblast, and the y-axis the 
cumulative proportion of total oblast revenues received by the 
corresponding proportion of people. If all oblasts had the same per capita 
revenue the Lorenz curve for revenues would run along the 45° line; in 
reality a Lorenz curve will always drop below this line.
The concentration curves are then drawn with population again ranked 
along the x-axis in terms of their region's per capita revenue but with the y- 
axis representing the proportion of total transfers (or additional VAT 
retentions) received by the corresponding proportion of people. Thus if 
transfers were equalizing we would expect the concentration curves to rise 
above the 45° line: the poorest 10% of the population ranked by oblast per 
capita revenue should receive more than 10% of transfers.
9The charts are given with revenues and transfers deflated to Moscow 1991 prices 
using a regional Consumer Price Index weighted by the price of a basket of 19 food 
products in December 1991 (see Annex 2 for details). All monetary figures used from 
here on are deflated in the same way. The idea is that, as price levels and inflation rates 
vary substantially across the Russian Federation an analysis of any monetary indicator 
considered in nominal terms could be quite misleading. The indices used are not ideal 
for deflating budgetary data — for example, they fail to take account of compensating 





























































































The figures reveal several interesting patterns. First, in each year the curve 
representing direct transfer receipts rises clearly above the 45° line, 
showing a definite equalizing impact with respect to revenue receipts. In
1993 for example, the 'poorest' 50% of the population lived in regions 
which controlled between them less than 30% of total revenues, but which 
received 80% of all direct transfers made. However, no trend towards 
greater equalization in direct transfer receipts is displayed over the period: 
the curves for direct transfers in 1994 and 1995 (after the introduction of 
the formula) are in fact closer to the 45° line than in 1993.
Second, the distribution of transfers through the additional VAT share 
mechanism appears in all years to have been substantially less equalizing 
than the distribution of direct transfers. This is particularly true in 1993, 
when the curve for additional VAT retentions not only falls well below the 
45° line but below the Lorenz curve for revenue receipts: additional VAT 
retentions were still more unevenly distributed than initial own-revenue 
retentions. In 1994 and 1995 however, the pattern of allocation of 
additional VAT is much more similar to that of direct transfers. The result 
is that when both types of transfer are combined, the overall impact 
(shown in each graph by an unbroken line) is noticeably more equalizing in
1994 and 1995 than in 1993. In 1993 the bottom 50% of the distribution 
received between them about half of the total sum of transfers; by 1995 
their share had increased to almost 70%.
If additional VAT retentions are treated as a regular part of the transfer 
process (and simply a means of distributing part of the allocation 
determined through the formula system) then it would appear that the 
introduction of the FFFS and the formula in 1994 did improve the 
allocation. At the same time, the difference in the distributions of the two 
forms of transfer suggest that regions are still able to use their influence, if 
not to affect the total nominal amount received, then to affect the time at 
which it is received. In a high inflation environment this in turn means 
affecting the real sum. The evidence given by the figures is that the regions 
benefiting from receipt in the form of VAT retention are not the regions 
most in need.
It needs to be noted however that the difference in the two patterns 
represents to some degree at least the impact of the handful of regions 




























































































Bashkortostan all show up on the charts as steep slopes in the richest fifth 
of the VAT retention curve. Each of these regions effectively refused to 
participate in the system and negotiated their own arrangements with the 
federal government; as a result in 1993 they submitted no VAT to the 
centre. This appears to be what is driving the sharp degree of inequality 
observed in the distribution of VAT retentions in Figure 1: these three 
regions together, representing some 6% of the population, between them 
retain close to 40% of all VAT retentions. By 1994 Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan had both begun to hand over some of the revenue, retaining 
only 70% in total in 1994 and 60% in 1995. Only Sakha continued to 
retain all VAT through 1995. This probably explains the change in the 
shape of the VAT retention curves over the period. It could also be the 
explanation of why regions which receive transfers as VAT retentions and 
not through the centre appear to those less in need.
To try to answer these questions and test the patterns revealed here in a 
wider context I now move onto multivariate analysis. This will allow me to 
control for the influence of the 'special case1 regions, and to introduce both 
a wider range of variables to represent regional need and some proxies for 
regional power. Below I define my hypotheses, discuss the econometric 
framework chosen for each and introduce the possibilities for explanatory 
variables. In Section 6 1 present and discuss the results.
5. Hypotheses, econometric framework and explanatory 
variables
5.1 Hypotheses
The primary aim of the multivariate analysis is to isolate the 
characteristics of the regions that received 'equalizing transfers' in 1993, 
1994 and 1995. In a successful equalizing system, recipient regions 
should be characterized by a variety of 'need' indicators, representing both 
weak fiscal capacity and strong pressure on services. In contrast, in a 
corrupt system, or in one in which theoretically equalizing transfers are in 
practice used to alternative ends, recipients would be characterized by a 
series of quite different indicators, representing their political influence, 
their ability to negotiate or the potential threat they pose to the centre. The 





























































































This is a general framework which has been used in a series of studies of 
the allocation of transfers in other large federations. (See for example 
Holcombe and Zardkoohi (1982), Grossman (1994) and Peterson (1995) 
on the distribution of federal grants in the USA, and Bungey et al. (1991) 
on Australia.) The hypothesis that needs are the main determinants of 
transfers, referred to as the 'efficiency/equity/ideology' hypothesis, or 
'functional theory' (since transfers fulfill their equalizing function), is 
tested against that of the 'public choice' hypothesis or 'legislative theory' 
(grants will be awarded according to the private agendas of legislators).
In the Russian case, where post-1994 allocation is governed by a simple 
formula mechanism, the room for public choice type explanations would 
appear to be limited. The formula does seem to be open to small measures 
of interpretation (see Appendix l),10 while the design of the formula itself 
may have been subject to influence: the choice of actual past expenditure 
as the proxy for expenditure needs clearly benefits certain regions more 
than others. However, short-term political factors will certainly have less 
capacity than before to influence outcomes. At the same time the 
replacement of a system of ad hoc bargaining with a formula mechanism 
ought in principle to have improved the direction of transfers to regions in 
need, as the preliminary analysis in Section 4 suggested that it did. I 
therefore formulate my main hypothesis as follows:
HI Despite the doubts surrounding the design of the 1994 formula 
mechanism, its introduction led to an improvement in the allocation 
of equalization funds: transfers were higher after its introduction to 
regions with low fiscal capacity and high needs; and lower to 
regions with political influence or power.
This means comparing the parameters of three equations:
1. TRANSi93 = P i Nj93 + 71  Pi93 + en
2. TRANSj94 = P2 Ni94 + y2 Pi94 + £i2 
and 3. TRANS;95 = P3N;95 + 73 P;95 + Ei3
l0In the Australian case most grants are also formula-allocated, but in some cases the 
formulae are complicated enough to allow some subjective interpretation, allowing 
political factors a foothold (Bungey et al. (1991)). In the Russian case the degree of 
'interpretation' possible will be limited, revolving around the way of adjusting past 




























































































where TRANS it is the level of 'equalizing' transfers per capita made to 
oblast i in year t (directiy or via extra VAT retentions), N is a vector of 
needs indicators, P a vector of 'power' indicators and the (is and ys 
corresponding vectors of coefficients. HI is effectively the hypothesis 
that the j3s will be larger and more significant in Equations 2 and 3 than 
in Equation 1, while the opposite will be hue of the ys.
Given that (at least in 1994 and 1995) the variation in VAT retentions 
was apparently used as a means of distributing legitimate transfers from 
the FFFS, in all years I treat transfers as equivalent whether they came 
directly from the Fund or whether they were given as VAT retentions. In 
other words, in addressing Hypothesis 1 I take as my dependent variable 
TRANSjt, the sum of both these types of transfer. In practice however, as 
discussed in Section 3.3, there is an important difference between the 
two. For all those regions which received transfers of some sort I 
therefore go on to ask the same question with respect to the proportion 
received as VAT transfer: was it regions in need that benefited, or regions 
with power? I thus formulate a second hypothesis:
H2 Oblast authorities continued to use their influence to affect the 
proportion of their allocation received in the form of VAT 
retention.
This involves examining the parameters of Equations 4-6:
4. VATPERj93 = y4 Pi93 + £,4
5. VATPERi94 = ys P;94 + £15
6. VATPERj94 = y6 Pi94 + £i6
where VATPERjt is the proportion of total transfers that oblast i receives 
in the form of additional VAT retentions in year t, and the ys the same 
vectors of power variables used in Equations 1-3. H2 is the hypothesis 
that the ys will be positive and significant in all three equations. In 





























































































5.2 Econometric framework 
a) Hypothesis 1: Tobit
Given the fact that not all oblasts received subventions at all in any of the 
three years 1993-95, I choose to use a Tobit framework to address 
Hypothesis 1. The dependent variables in Equations 1-3 each have a 
concentration of values at zero and then a continuous distribution of 
values above zero (about one third of the observations are zeroes in 1993, 
falling to 10% by 1995). Ordinary Least Squares estimation, which 
assumes all values to be part of a continuous distribution and ignores the 
qualitative difference between zeroes and non-zeroes, will therefore be an 
inappropriate estimation technique.
The Tobit itself imposes the assumption that a single underlying model 
determines both whether or not an oblast receives transfers and how much 
it receives (see for example Greene (1993), Chapter 22). This is perhaps 
unrealistic given that (post 1994 at least) we know the two processes to 
have been formally different. However, given that the purpose of the 
regressions is to identify and compare the characteristics of oblasts 
receiving transfers in different years, not to model the determination 
process itself, it is plausible that a Tobit would be sufficient. Furthermore, 
using a more general model, such as that developed by Cragg (1971), 
which allows the two decisions to be modeled separately by combining a 
univariate probit model with a truncated regression model, would be 
costly: it would effectively double the number of parameters to be 
estimated. Given the small sample size I decided to stick with the Tobit.11
For the Tobit model we define a new underlying variable y*, which is a 
linear function of the set of needs and power variables with which we 
hope to describe transfers, but each yj* is only observed if is greater than 
zero. That is:
7. yi* = P Nj + 7 Pj + ej ej ~ N (0, o,2)
where N and P are vectors of needs and power indicators respectively.
"In fact I did also estimate a Cragg model and established that for 1994 and 1995 
there was some evidence that the parameters defining those oblasts which received 
subventions differed from those defining how much was received. However, the 
differences were small and concerned only the size of the effect and not the 
significance or sign of the variables. They did not seem to warrant abandoning the 




























































































yi = yi* if yi* > o
yi = 0 otherwise
Intuitively, y* stands for the level of transfer that would be received if a 
negative transfer (or taxation) process operated according to the same 
mechanism as the actual transfer process. If we could observe y*, we 
would observe negative values for richer oblasts (if the mechanism was 
equalizing). In practice, as there is no negative transfer process, we 
observe yi = 0 wherever yj* would be negative: yj is essentially censored 
at zero. P and y are estimated by maximum likelihood.
B ut for each  observation  yj we observe:
b) Hypothesis 2: Two Limit Tobit
In testing Hypothesis 2 I automatically exclude for each year the 
observations which received no transfers at all. However, the censoring 
problem remains: as the dependent variable is measured as a percentage it 
is naturally bounded both from below at zero and from above at 100. In 
practice in 1993 and 1994 there were no zero observations but a 
substantial proportion of 100s (20% in 1993 and 13% in 1994). In 1995 
only 5% of observations received all transfers in the form of VAT 
retention but 17% received none.
Again therefore an OLS framework would not appear to be appropriate. 
This time the choice of a Tobit as the alternative is more clear-cut, as 
censoring is not imposed by the operation of a separate mechanism but 
results simply from measurement of the dependent variable in percentage 
terms. Thus we define a new underlying variable z*, a linear function of 
the set of needs and power variables, but this time each zj* is only 
observed if is greater than zero or less than 100. That is:
8. zj* = P Nj + y Pi + ej ej ~ N (0, Oj2)
where N and P are vectors of needs and power indicators respectively. 
But now for each observation z\ we observe:
II N if 100 > zj* > 0
zj = 100 if zj* > 100




























































































The idea here is simply that no region can retain more than 100% or less 
than none of its transfers as VAT, no matter how high or low its recorded 
level of the explanatory variables. If the percentage of transfers an oblast 
receives in the form of VAT is determined by the oblast's power, we can 
see zj* as an underlying unobserved variable representing this power: we 
observe only zj, a percentage bounded from above and below.
5.3 Dependent variables
As discussed, the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1 is the sum of direct 
transfers received by the oblast as equalization funds, and the amount 
received as additional VAT retentions over and above 30%. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 3. Figures are in per capita terms and in 
Moscow 1991 prices, as deflated by the price index detailed in Appendix 
2. 76 oblasts are included: that is, all oblasts except Ingushetia and the 11 
autonomous oblasts, for which not all data is available. (These 11 
represent between them only about 3% of the total population.)
There are three interesting elements in Table 3. First, the mean level of 
transfers (excluding zeroes) fell by about one-third between 1993 and 
1994, and in 1995 at 204 roubles per capita it was still lower than it had 
been before the introduction of the formula system. Second, the number 
of regions receiving transfers increased dramatically: in 1993 21 regions 
out of 76 received nothing; by 1995 the figure was only 7 regions, less 
than 10%. That a greater number of regions are receiving transfers, and 
that they are receiving less each on average, does not suggest that there 
has been an improvement in targeting. The 1995 allocation would make 
sense only if there were 7 extremely wealthy regions able to support 69 
oblasts in need, and this seems unlikely. The allocation could however 
still represent an improvement on the past if the oblasts 'targeted' in 1993 
were not those most in need.
The third point worth noting is that the mean as measured over all 76 
oblasts also fell substantially (some 30%) between 1993 and 1994, 
recovering almost but not entirely by 1995. Thus although the sum 
allocated to the FFFS increased between 1994 and 1995, this was still not 





























































































Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables in HI: Transfers 
plus additional VAT retentions over 30%. roubles per capita (76 













1993 269 195 44 749 168 21
1994 173 139 1 645 131 15
1 1995 204 185 5 909 165 7
The dependent variable in Hypothesis 2 is the percentage of total transfers 
which is received in the form of VAT retentions. Only regions which 
received some form of transfer are included as observations for each year. 
Furthermore, the four regions which received transfers simply because 
they did not participate in the system (and so received additional VAT by 
default) were also dropped, as the reason they received all transfers in the 
form of VAT retention is clear. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 4 .1 present statistics for all observations only.
It is worth drawing attention in Table 4 to the large number of regions 
which benefited to some degree from additional VAT retentions. This 
was by no means a practice confined to the recalcitrant regions referred to 
in Section 3.3. In fact in 1993 and 1994 every single oblast to receive 
transfers received them at least in part in the form of additional VAT 
share. By 1995 however VAT retention appears to have become far less 
important in the transfer process: one sixth received no extra VAT, only 
one received all transfers as VAT, and the mean share of VAT in total 
transfers had fallen to 20%.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables in H2: Percentage
No. of 
obs.









1993 51 52 32 0 8
1994 57 60 25 0 4





























































































The explanatory variables used to test HI fall into two broad categories — 
those representing regional need and those intended to proxy regional 
power and influence in Moscow. Within the needs group two separate 
effects need to be covered, fiscal capacity and pressure on local services. 
The latter is itself the result of two separate factors, the size of demand 
and the unit cost of provision. The challenge is to include each of these 
factors but only insofar as they are beyond local authority control.
Needs variables 
1. FISCAL CAPACITY
The easy route in measuring fiscal capacity is to give local authorities the 
benefit of the doubt over tax collection and treat actual revenues collected 
per capita as a rough measure of revenue raising potential. This is 
essentially what the FEES formula chooses to do, and there are fairly 
strong arguments for doing it here too. In a context in which direct 
measures of economic strength such as income levels, unemployment and 
oblast production levels all carry substantial measurement problems, 
actual revenues may be as accurate as any alternative, while their use 
makes the analysis decidedly more straightforward. I therefore follow the 
approach of the FEES on this count, including as the first explanatory 
variable in each equation per capita oblast revenues prior to any transfers 
(lagged, i.e., for the year prior to that in which the transfers were made):
• Own revenues per capita in the year prior to transfers (measured in 
1991 prices).
2. PRESSURE ON SERVICES
The FEES formula uses a combination of past levels of expenditures in the 
region in question and average past expenditures in the surrounding area as 
a proxy for both elements of expenditure needs, demand for local services 
and unit cost of provision. Here I try to model the factors influencing 
expenditure needs directly.
a) Demand for local services
I initially tried including the following two variables as indicators of 
pressure on local education services on the one hand and on local health 
services on the other:
• Percentage of the population under 16:




























































































In practice however these two variables are quite strongly negatively 
correlated: regions with a high proportion of young people (often those in 
the North and Far East) tend to have fewer pensioners. Combining the two 
into a single variable (the proportion of the population not of working age) 
loses the effect of either, so I replace PENSION with an alternative 
measure of demand on health care services:
• The infant mortality rate.
This variable ought also to reflect both weak inherited infrastructure in the 
health care sector and generally poor local conditions: infant mortality in 
developing countries tends to be highly correlated with poverty, and may 
therefore be a good proxy for poverty here. (Poverty headcount data is 
available by oblast for 1994 but there are question marks about its 
reliability, particularly as a comparative measure.). Life expectancy at birth 
was also tried as an alternative but infant mortality proved to be more 
effective.
b) Cost of unit provision
Four variables were initially included to represent different costs of service 
provision facing regions:
• Dummy for Northern status: a dummy for regions partially located 
north of 67 degrees latitude, intended to pick up increased costs of 
transport and heating;
• Wage in the education sector: the average regional monthly wage in the 
education sector, deflated to Moscow 1991 prices. The point here is 
that, aside from nominal differences in wages resulting from price 
variation, 'compensating wage differentials' have traditionally been paid 
to workers to encourage them to live in harsh parts of the country. 
These differentials represent an additional cost of employing each 
worker beyond the control of the authorities. (The education wage is 
intended as a proxy for all public sector wages.) I include the wage for 
1992, adjusted for regional inflation in later years, on the grounds that 
since 1992 authorities have had more control over public sector wages 
and differentials may not partially represent preferences;
• Oblast population. Small regions may face higher unit costs of provision 
as they will be unable to exploit economies of scale. I try replacing this 
with the log of population, as the importance of changes in size is likely 
to diminish as the oblast gets bigger;
• Percentage of the population urbanized. Again, economies of scale 




























































































to fall as the concentration of the population in urban areas increases. 
Sparsely populated rural areas may require more funding per capita to 
provide the same level of services as more developed areas. (As cities 
increase in size diseconomies of scale may set in due to the costs of 
congestion and the higher price of factor goods, and it is possible
that expenditure needs per capita start rising again. I tried including a 
Moscow City/St. Petersburg dummy but it was always insignificant.)
Power variables
There are a variety of different ways in which regions might exercise 
influence over the centre, but these can broadly be divided into two 
general categories: blackmail style tactics (threats) and ingratiating tactics 
(having friends in the right places).
To represent the first I include five variables. The first two are intended to 
represent respectively the likelihood and significance of a region 
withdrawing cooperation from the centre (that is, the importance of 
appeasing the region):
• Republic status. Despite the fact that all regions are declared equal in 
the Constitution, the 19 republics consider themselves to be more 
autonomous than other types of regions (oblasts, krai) and have been 
considerably more outspoken in their demands on the centre. They 
formed the bulk of the group of regions to call for sovereignty in 1992 
and 1993, and were the first to sign bilateral fiscal agreements with the 
centre. As a result they are widely held to have benefited from special 
treatment. This dummy for republican status is intended to pick up the 
material effects of this status. (As republics are also in principle 
ethnically based, it should also pick up the effect of any transfers made 
to ease ethnic tension.)
• The percentage of national fuel production which is produced in the 
region. This is intended to represent the potential danger offered if a 
region does choose to secede.
The second pair of variables are included to represent different types of 
threat to the centre: on the one hand threat of civil unrest and on the other 
personal threat to Yeltsin's power:
• Number of workers on strike: the number of workers per 10,000 who 
went on strike in the year prior to that in which transfers were made.
• Support for Yeltsin 1993: The degree of support displayed for Yeltsin 




























































































'yes' to the question 'Do you have confidence in the President of the 
Russian Federation, B.N.Yeltsin?'). The idea here is that transfers may 
have been used to bribe regional leaders to come out in support of 
Yeltsin in areas where he was most likely to lose; hence we might 
expect a negative correlation between the 'yes' vote and receipt of 
transfers. (Alternatively, of course, transfers may have been used as a 
reward for well-behaved regions, in which case the coefficient would 
display the opposite sign.) Naturally this variable is more likely to be 
significant for 1993 transfers than for those in later years but no similar 
data is available afterwards until the Presidential election of 1996. 
(Data for elections to the Duma are much less clear cut — see below.)
Finally I include a dummy variable for the four regions which enjoyed 
special status over the period;
• Dummy for special status: a dummy included for Karelia, Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia).
'Threat' variables are perhaps unique to a somewhat lawless situation such 
as that prevailing in the former Soviet Union, and are not usually included 
in analyses of transfer allocation in more stable western democracies. In 
contrast, measures of the second type of influence, having friends in the 
right places, are included in these studies. The variables chosen however 
are generally along directly political lines, such as the proportion of 
regional representatives who come from the majority central party, 
whereas in the Russian case the party system seems too ill-defined and 
too new to make party affiliation a good indicator of an oblast's 
influence.12 It seems more likely that past personal and political 
relationships will be of significance than the party a regional leader 
belongs to now. This is perhaps especially convincing when one 
considers that there is an 82% overlap between current regional elites and 
the old Soviet era regional nomenclature, and 75% overlap in central 
government and the presidential circle (Hanson (1996), p.3).
If this is right, a variable representing the degree of privilege enjoyed by 
the oblast in the past may be a reasonable proxy for access to the ear of 
central authorities today. I therefore include one variable intended to pick 
up this privilege:
• The percentage of urban households with a private telephone at the 
end of the Soviet era (1990).
12See Maximov (1995) on the difficulty of categorizing current parties even as far as 




























































































For the analysis of Hypothesis 2 I use this same set of power variables 
and also include a selection of the needs variables to control for 
population size, regional wealth etc.: I include revenues per capita, 
population size and urbanization. In all cases, variables were taken for the 
year prior to that in which the transfer was made, except for urbanization 
(1992 for all regressions) and for variables clearly constant over time. 
These can be seen in Table 5, where means and standard deviations are 
given for each explanatory variable.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for explanatory variables (76 observations)
1993 1994 1995
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
NEEDS
Own revenues per capita 
(1991 roubles)
1,083 912 1,391 748 1,213 774
Population under 16 (%) 25 3.5 24 3.5 24 3.5
Infant mortality rate 
(deaths per 1000 live births)
17.8 3.0 19.7 3.4 18.6 2.7
Northern (dummy) 7 positive values
Average wage in the 
education sector in 1992 
(1991 roubles)
355 126 389 146 356 130
Population (thousands) 1,904 1,512 1,904 1,510 1,902 1,504
Population (log) 7.3 0.74 7.3 0.74 7.3 0.75
Urbanization (%) 69.2 13.0 as 1993 as 1993
POWER
Republic status (dummy) 19 positive values
Percentage of national fuel 
production (%)
1.3 3.8 as 1993 as 1993
Workers on strike per 
10,000
36.2 72.1 2.6 12.4 9.1 26.1
Support for Yeltsin 1993 
(% 'yes')
56.0 12.3 as 1993 as 1993
1 'Special status' (dummy) 4 positive values
Households with a private 
phone 1990 (%)
30.4 11.1 as 1993 as 1993





























































































6.1 Hypothesis 1: the allocation of transfers
Table 6: Tobit results for per capita transfer allocations in 1993, 1994 and
1995 (76 observations per year)
II Explanatory variables 1993 1994 1995 E x p .s ig n  I 
__ ______
NEEDS














































































I Standard error 139.9 89.5 105.3 r
I  Log likelihood -366.5 -370.3 -423.4
1 Pseudo R2 0.08 0.10 0.09
T-statistics are given in brackets. Variables in bold were significant at the 10% level. For the 
needs variables, the 'expected signs of P‘ are those which we would expect to see if transfers 
were equalizing with respect to the variable in question; for the power variables, they are 
those we would expect if oblast threats or influence were positively affecting the level of 
transfers received.
Table 6 presents the results of the Tobit regressions run on transfers in 




























































































three equations were dropped. The same formulation was kept for all 
three years to ease comparison.
Two things are immediately striking about these results. First, there is no 
clear evidence that a change in regime took place between 1993 and 
1994. Signs and significance of coefficients show remarkable continuity 
over the period despite the introduction of the formula system in 1994. In 
fact there appears to be more difference between results for 1994 and 
1995 than for those for 1993 and 1994.13 Second, across the period needs 
variables appear to be both significant and indicative of an equalizing 
effect; 'power' variables are less significant and also more equivocal in 
their impact.
With the exception of the dummy variable for northern location, all needs 
variables which are significant display an equalizing impact across the 
period. Other things equal, per capita transfers were significantly higher 
in 1993 and 1994 to regions with lower own-revenues per capita, a higher 
infant mortality rate, higher public sector wages (hence higher costs of 
provision), and smaller and more rural populations. In 1995 public sector 
wages no longer had an explanatory impact, but transfers were higher to 
regions where a greater proportion of the population was below working 
age. Hence across the period transfers do seem to go to regions with 
lower fiscal capacity, greater demand on services, and higher unit 
provision costs.
The flow of transfers thus seems to have been in the right direction. But 
how far did transfers succeed in compensating for differing needs and 
revenue abilities? With respect to differences in revenue-raising ability, 
the impact of transfers appears small. Other things equal, in 1993 each 
per-capita rouble less raised in own-revenues was compensated by just 
one tenth of a rouble in additional transfers. After the introduction of the 
formula system in 1994, the degree of compensation halved: in 1994 and 
1995 only one in twenty roubles less in own-revenues was replaced by a 
transfer. Thus while more transfers did go to poorer than to richer regions, 
their impact appears to have been negligible, post-1994 in particular. The 
difference between the coefficient for 1993 and those for the later two
,3A likelihood ratio test does however allow us to reject at the 1% significance level 
the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across either pair of years. The test 
statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients for 1993 and 1994 were identical was 
32.6; that for the same hypothesis for 1994 and 1995 was 28.7. The critical value in 




























































































years is in part due to a fall in the total sum made available for transfers 
(notably with respect to 1994), and in part to the greater numbers of 
regions qualifying for assistance (notably with respect to 1995, when the 
total sum available was similar to that in 1993, but when all but seven 
regions were eligible for transfers).
What of the impact on transfer receipts of variation in the cost of service 
provision? Here transfers appeared to respond extremely well in 1993, 
and again much less well after the introduction of the formula. In 1993 an 
extra rouble on the average cost of employing a worker in the education 
sector was met by a per capita increase in transfers of 0.64 roubles; in 
1994 an extra rouble meant only 0.21 roubles extra per capita. However, 
as the total number of public sector employees ought to be substantially 
less than one per capita, this suggests significant over-compensation in 
1993; high cost regions may have received far more than they needed to 
cover their costs, the situation in 1994 representing an improvement. The 
fact that the education wage is not significant at all in 1995 is mysterious.
In each year transfers were also higher to regions with smaller 
populations and to those with lower urbanization rates. The log of 
population proved to have greater explanatory power than a linear 
population term, implying a diminishing role for population size as 
population increases. A region with a log population size one standard 
deviation below average would have received an additional 60 or 70 
roubles per capita in 1993 and 1995, and about half that in 1994 (some 
20-30% of the average per capita transfer). A region with an urbanization 
rate one standard deviation above the average would have benefited by 
roughly the same amount, between 50 and 60 roubles extra per capita in 
each year.
The last variable included to proxy provision costs, the dummy for 
northern regions, is the only needs variable which clearly shows a 
counter-equalizing effect for transfers. In theory the dummy is intended to 
pick up the additional costs of heating etc. associated with service 
provision in the Far North; in practice, holding other factors constant, it 
seems that the seven regions located furthest north get substantially less 
in transfers than other areas. Their situation was particularly harsh in 
1993, when being Northern meant 190 roubles per capita less against a 
mean transfer of 195 roubles per capita. In 1994 Northern regions got 90 
roubles less on average against a mean of 140 roubles, so the negative 




























































































Northern regions would have had to have per capita revenues two 
standard deviations higher than the mean to compensate for their 
Northern status, or an education wage two or three times higher. Given 
that northern regions have higher compensating wage differentials than 
elsewhere a relationship might seem plausible between the two variables: 
the northern dummy might be acting to dampen the impact of the 
education wage at the upper end of the scale. However, the large size of 
the coefficients on the northern dummy makes this unlikely. Furthermore, 
a non-linear term for the wage (the education wage squared) turned out 
not to be significant, while the result for the northern dummy proved 
robust to the exclusion of the education wage altogether.
Finally, turning to the variables representing demand on regional services, 
we find a smallish impact, despite the general equalizing direction of 
transfers. In all three years an additional 3 points on infant mortality 
(roughly the standard deviation) brings in roughly between 25 and 35 
roubles more in transfers per capita. The proportion of the population 
below working age is significant only in 1995 when an additional 3 
percentage points of children in the population (again the standard 
deviation) means about the same in transfers as an extra 3 points on infant 
mortality.
These results are summed up in Table 7, which shows how many 
additional roubles per capita would have been received by a hypothetical 
region differing from a standard region with respect to each of the given 
needs characteristics. The size of the variation chosen for each variable is 
roughly equal to the standard deviation from the mean for that variable in 
1993. The average actual transfer (including zero values) is given in the 
bottom row for reference.
The table makes it easier to address the first part of Hypothesis 1. Were 
transfers higher after 1994 to regions with low fiscal capacity and high 
needs? The table shows that in 1993 a region which had greater needs than 
the average in all of the given categories would have received a total of 
334 roubles per capita more than a region with average characteristics. 
After the introduction of the formula system, the same high-needs region 
would only have received an additional 197 roubles per capita in 1994 and 
229 roubles in 1995. The formula mechanism, while making the system 
transparent and apparently less arbitrary, does not seem to have improved 
its practical impact for regions in need. The difference appears largely due 




























































































capita own-revenues and to the education wage. It should also be noted 
that it is not simply a result of a change in total transfers made. If we 
compare the extra received by the hypothetical needy region to the average 
overall transfer made (i.e. if we compare the bottom two rows of Table 7) 
we find a ratio of 1.7 in 1993, falling to 1.4 in 1994 and 1.2 in 1995.
Table 7: Benefit gained from differing from a standard region with 
respect to each needs variable (roubles per capita)
Variable Difference from 
standard region
1993 1994 1995
Own revenues per capita 900 roubles less 99 54 45
Percentage under 16s 3 percentage 
points higher
33
Infant mortality rate 3 percentage 
points higher
37 23 36
Education wage 130 roubles 
higher
83 27
Log population 750 less 69 34 59
Urbanization 13 percentage 
points less
46 59 56
Total extra gained by a region differing from 
1 standard on ALL above characteristics
334 197 229
AVERAGE PER CAPITA TRANSFER 
\ (ALL OBSERVATIONS)
195 139 185
The only needy regions which look to be doing better in 1995 than before 
are those in the north. A region with all the need characteristics given in 
Table 7 but located in the Far North would have received only an 
additional 143 roubles per capita in 1993 and 109 roubles in 1994, but 229 
roubles in 1995.
What of the second part of Hypothesis 1? Transfers may not be more 
equalizing post 1994 than before, but the formula should at least have 
diminished the impact of regional power over the allocation process. That 
part of transfers not explained by needs factors should now be explained 
less well by power factors; if not more equalizing their allocation should at 
least be more arbitrary.
Turning back to Table 6 we find that in practice this does appear to be the 




























































































proxies had no impact at all. The most surprising of these is the dummy 
included for regions with republic status. Despite the conventional 
wisdom, being a republic had no effect on a region's receipts once 
population size and revenues had been controlled for. A fourth variable, 
the percentage of national fuel output produced in the region, was 
significant in one year only and had the opposite sign to that expected: 
other things equal in 1994 a greater share of fuel output was associated 
with lower transfer receipts, indicating that this was not used as a means of 
influencing central decisions.
As expected, the influence of having 'special status', that is of being one of 
the four regions to have special regimes legitimized with the centre, was 
enormous in 1993, falling over time as these regions began to comply with 
general rules. In 1993 being one of the Big Four brought in on average 617 
additional roubles per capita. In practice, the average receipt in these four 
regions was 520 roubles per capita, suggesting that none of the benefit 
received by these regions can be explained by other variables: in fact 
without the impact of their special status they would have received 
'negative' transfers. By 1994 however this status only brought in 316 
roubles per capita (average receipt in practice — 300 roubles), and in 1995 
150 roubles.
The special status variable however is somewhat different from the other 
indicators of power. Of these only the extent of the phone network in 
1990, theoretically representative of past favour from central authorities, is 
positive and significant and this only in 1993. In 1993 an extra 10% of 
households with access to a private telephones was associated, other 
things equal, with an additional 35 roubles per capita in transfers against 
the mean of 195 roubles, but in 1994 and 1995 it no longer had any 
impact. This appears to suggest that connections at the centre were useful 
in gaining additional funds in the ad hoc system of 1993, but not after the 
introduction of the formula — which is intuitively appealing and evidence 
in favour of the second part of Hypothesis 1. We do need to be somewhat 
careful however: given the difficulty of isolating power proxies and the 




























































































6.2 Hypothesis 2: The percentage of transfers received as VAT 
retentions
Table 8: Tobit results for percentage of VAT retentions in transfers 1993,
1994 and 1995 (51, 57 and 65 observations respectively)
Explanatory variables 1993 1994 1995 Exp.sig 
n of y
CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS




























































Standard error 21.8 22.6 21.7
Log likelihood -199.8 -244.1 -249.8
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.04 0.02
Results in bold are significant at the 10% level. Naturally only regions receiving some form 
of transfer were included. In addition, the four regions benefiting from special regimes 
(Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia) were omitted as they by definition 
received all transfers in VAT retentions.
Table 8 gives results for Tobit regressions run on the percentage of 
transfers received in the form of VAT. As discussed above, there are 
substantial advantages to receiving transfers in this form rather than 
remitting the bulk of VAT collection to the centre and then waiting for 
transfers to arrive through the official channels. Given high inflation, non- 
indexed transfers and often long payment delays, the method through 
which transfers are received can make a significant difference to the real 




























































































needy regions appeared to do less well from transfers in 1995 than they 
had done under the closed-door system of 1993. But the proportion of 
these transfers made as VAT retention was much higher in 1993 (50%) 
than in 1995 (20%), even when the four 'special status' regions are 
exluded. If it is the less needy and the more powerful that are able to 
benefit from this means of allocation, it could be that the new system is 
an improvement on the old after all.
The regression results which are presented in Table 8 are however 
somewhat surprising. Expected to reveal a pattern of richer regions 
manipulating the system to their own ends, in practice they reveal no 
particular pattern at all. The clearest impression the results give is that, if 
any particular factors were important in determining which regions 
benefited from receipt through VAT retention, these factors were unique 
to a single year and did not persist over time. None of the variables 
included proved significant in more than one year. In 1993, larger and 
more urbanized regions were likely to receive more transfers as VAT 
retention, while there also seemed to be both a 'reward' effect for regions 
which supported Yeltsin in the 1993 referendum and a 'punishment' effect 
for regions with higher numbers of workers involved in strikes. In 1994 
however the only significant characteristic of regions which did well was 
that they tended to be richer: each extra hundred roubles in own revenues 
per capita was associated with an extra percentage of transfers as VAT. 
But by 1995 own revenues were again no longer relevant, and the 
percentage of workers involved in strikes now had the opposite role to 
that in 1993: more strikes meant a higher share of transfers through the 
VAT retention mechanism.
These miscellaneous results defy generalization: no pattern emerges over 
time, and the lack of continuity suggests that the significance of any given 
variable in a particular year is purely coincidental. Naturally it is quite 
possible that the power variables used are simply not picking up a key 
instrument of regional influence, but the inability of the variables 
included to pick up any consistent pattern is interesting. A system which 
allows transfers to be allocated by two different mechanisms, where this 
results in unintended changes in the final sum received, can be 
condemned for both its injustice and its inefficiency. However, it is 
encouraging to note that the distinction appears to be genuinely arbitrary, 






























































































While in a country of Russia's size decentralization of the fiscal system is 
perhaps essential, the high degree of regional economic diversity makes a 
strong and effective transfer mechanism crucial if all regions are to 
continue to be able to provide adequate standards of public services 
during the transition and beyond. The Russian transfer system has 
developed in a fairly ad hoc fashion since 1992 and has come in for 
substantial criticism for insufficient targeting, for allowing wealthier 
regions to negotiate their own terms and for favouring politically 
threatening regions over those really in need. In this paper I have 
attempted to address and quantify these claims by isolating the 
characteristics of regions receiving transfers over the period 1993-1995. I 
aimed to establish whether these transfers are really going to regions in 
need of them, and if not then whether their allocation is apparently 
arbitrary or affected by factors of regional power and influence. At the 
same time, I hoped to discover whether the replacement of closed door 
negotiations with a formula mechanism in 1994 made a favourable 
difference to allocations.
The results of this paper tend to support the system's critics rather than the 
system itself, although some of the conclusions can be painted in a 
positive light. It is true for instance that the four regions which refused to 
play by the rules (and were tolerated in so doing) received what in 
practice amounted to substantial transfers when they ought not to have 
qualified for anything at all. But this situation has improved over time: by 
1995 only one of these regions was remitting no tax receipts to the federal 
budget — this could almost be seen as a victory for the federal authorities. 
In addition to these four, there are a number of regions which benefited in 
more subtle ways by exploiting a high inflation environment, either by 
remitting their taxes with several month delays, or by taking their transfer 
allocation immediately as VAT retention instead of waiting for transfers 
to be made through official channels. The former phenomenon was 
impossible to investigate in the absence of monthly budget data, but an 
analysis of the characteristics of regions receiving transfers as VAT 
showed, surprisingly, no evidence that those to benefit were richer or 
more powerful than other regions. The dual-channel allocation system 
remains inefficient and unjust, but at least it appears to have worked 
randomly. Another positive result is that the relative importance of VAT 
retention in transfer receipts is becoming less important over time, 





























































































Finally, across the period the distribution of transfers has been basically 
equalizing, with per capita transfers higher to regions with greater needs. 
Regions with lower per capita own revenues, higher infant mortality, 
more children, higher compensating wage differentials, and smaller and 
more urban populations all received more per capita in transfers. Only 
northern regions appeared to suffer, with the seven regions located 
furthest north receiving substantially less in transfers than other areas 
with similar characteristics. Even in 1993, before the introduction of the 
formula, transfers followed this equalizing pattern, suggesting that 
transfers were allocated on the basis of need even when the mechanism 
was non-transparent. Furthermore, though there did appear to be some 
indication of a link between power variables and transfers in 1993, the 
evidence was extremely weak. In particular, once special status and 
population size had been controlled for, there was no evidence that 
republics did better than other regions, despite widely held belief. In 1994 
and 1995 none of the power variables other than that for special status 
had a role to play.
However, the success of the system ought not to be overplayed on the 
basis of these findings. It is crucial to note that, although in the right 
direction, transfers over the period have made little more than a dent in 
the pre-transfer revenue distribution. In 1994 and 1995, holding all other 
characteristics constant, only one in twenty roubles less in own revenues 
raised per capita was compensated by a transfer. What is more, in this 
sense the allocation was substantially worse in 1994 and 1995 than before 
the introduction of the formula: in 1993 one in ten roubles less in own 
revenues was matched by compensation. Thus not only do the transfers 
appear to be of little more than nominal assistance, but three years of 
tinkering with the system seems only to have made it worse.
There are two different reasons for the system's weak equalizing impact. 
The first is an inadequate level of total funds made available for transfers. 
The size of equalization funds hit bottom in 1994, but in 1995 was still 
low by international standards: the share of total transfers in consolidated 
budget expenditure was less than half the OECD average. The second 
reason is that the literature appears to be right in claiming that targeting is 
inadequate and transfers too widely spread, particularly since the 
introduction of the formula mechanism. Classifying all regions with 
expenditures higher than revenues as in need of support simply allows too 




























































































support, an intergovernmental transfer system is of necessity about 
relative need: it is a zero sum game.
As of 1997 some changes are to have been made to the transfer system 
which may improve it. In particular, the fund's base is to be changed to 
15% of all federal revenue in an attempt to make its revenue more stable; 
this ought also to lead to an increase in the fund's size. In addition the 
adjustment coefficients for the first round of transfers are to be changed in 
a way that should benefit northern regions. But the basic substance of the 
formula will not be affected, which means the vast majority of regions 
will continue to qualify as needy. This in turn makes it likely that regions 
which are worst off will continue to receive insubstantial assistance. 
Given the high degree of responsibility which regional governments now 
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Figure 1
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Figure 2



























































































Percentage of population (cumulative)
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Figure 3



























































































Appendix 1 Terms o f the FFFS formula 1994 and 199514 
Round 1: Regions in need of support
Qualification
Using data for the base year (1993), oblasts are classified as being in need 
of support if:
1. Rev0b < RevRp * 0.95
where:
Revob = per capita tax revenue in a given oblast, adjusted for current 
conditions;
RevRp = per capita tax revenue in the RF for the same period of time, 
adjusted for current conditions; and
0.95 is the so-called 'coefficient of incentive', used to encourage oblasts to 
find their own resources for expenditure financing.
The decisive factor then is simply the oblast's per capita revenues in 
relation to the national average. 'Adjusted for current conditions' means 
taking into account changes in assigned revenue sources since the base 
year; that is, what would have been raised in 1993 had revenue assignment 
been the same as in the year in question. (This adjustment is what makes it 
difficult for us to recalculate an oblast's entitlement precisely.)
How large is the subvention?
If an oblast qualifies as being in need of support, the size of the transfer it 
should receive is calculated as follows, again using data for the base year 
(1993):
2. Tranjqs = Popw/0 * (RevRp - Rev0b) * (Exp£R / RevRp)
where:
Tranjqs = total rouble amount of the transfer to the oblast in need of 
support (in Round 1 only);
Popw/o = oblast population excluding the population of 'closed cities' 
(which come directly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence and 
the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and are financed separately);




























































































ExpER = average per capita regional expenditures (excluding capital 
investment) of all oblasts in the same 'economic region' (North, North- 
West, Central, Volgo-Vyatskiy, Black Earth, Volga, North Caucasus, 
Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East), adjusted for 
current conditions.
The amount of the grant is thus determined by the difference between the 
oblast's per capita revenues and the national average, weighted by the ratio 
of expenditures in the region as a whole to average revenues in the 
Federation. 'Adjusted for current conditions' means taking into account 
changes in expenditure responsibilities since the base year; that is, what 
would have been spent in 1993 if expenditure responsibilities were as they 
are in the year in question.
Round 2: Regions in need of considerable support
Qualification
Oblasts are classified as being in need of 'considerable support' if:
3. TranNS + (Popw/o * Rev0b) < TotExp0b
where:
TotExpob = total expenditures of the oblast budget excluding capital 
investment, adjusted for today's conditions.
Thus to qualify oblasts simply need to have total revenues (after the first 
theoretical round of transfers) less than total expenditures.
How large is the subvention?
Eligible oblasts are then entitled to an additional transfer calculated as:
4. Trancs = TotExp0b - (TranNS + Pop * Rev0b)
i.e. simply the amount which will enable them to cover their expenditures. 
Note that oblasts do not need to qualify for the first round of transfers in 
order to be eligible for the second round. An oblast with very high per 
capita revenues but even higher current expenditures would classify as an 
oblast in need of 'considerable support', and qualify for a rouble sum 




























































































Adjusting for total available funds
In a final stage, the calculated transfers are adjusted to be consistent with 
the total funds available in the year in question. This is done as follows:
5. FinTranjqs = TotalFundsjqs * (Tranks / £  Tranjqs)
6. FinTrancs = TotalFundsçs * (Trançs / £  Trancs)
where:
FinTranfvjs/çs = final amount of transfer made to region in need of 
support/considerable support;
TotalFundsNS/cs = the total amount available to all oblasts found in need 
of support/considerable support;
Tran]sfS/CS = amount of transfer to oblast in need of support/considerable 




























































































Appendix 2 Mechanism used for deflation of monetary terms
The deflation of oblast level monetary indicators presents difficulties as 
prices vary not just over time but between oblasts. While an oblast- 
specific Consumer Price Index does exist, it only exists as an index based 
on a standard of 1991=100 for each oblast; i.e., no base is available which 
allows for comparison across oblasts at any given point in time. Thus 
while we can calculate, say, a Moscow 1994 figure in Moscow 1991 
prices using the oblast CPI, we cannot translate a St. Petersburg 1994 
price into Moscow 1994 prices.
The one index which does provide the required cross-oblast base is the 
so-called '19 goods' index. This measures the cost in each oblast of a 
basket of nineteen foodstuffs which comprise the food component of the 
subsistence minimum basket, calculated by the Ministry of Labour since 
1992. The cost of the basket is available for each December starting from 
1992. The December cost of the 19 goods basket is clearly far from ideal 
as a proxy for the level of the CPI in that year, particularly given that a 
significant amount of price liberalization had already taken place in 1992 
and that foodstuffs are likely to have been kept under administrative 
control longer than other goods. However, it appears to be the only way 
in which monetary variables can be made close to comparable across 
oblasts.
I adjust the oblast CPI by the 19 goods index as follows:
Let CPIit be the cost of the Consumer Price basket in year t in oblast 
i, if the cost of the basket in 1991 in oblast i was 1 rouble, i.e.:
CPIjt = (Cost of Consumer Price basket)^ / (Cost of Consumer
Price basket)} i99i
Then let 19gj be an adjustment coefficient based on the relative cost 
of the 19 goods basket in each oblast in December 1992, i.e.:
19gi = 19giDEC92/19gbDEC92
where 19gjp)EC92 is the cost of the 19 goods basket in oblast i in 
December 1992 and 19gbD£C92 is the cost of the basket in a base 




























































































Then CPI19jt = CPIit * 19gi
so that CPI19jt is an oblast specific price index with 1991 as a base, 
adjusted by a coefficient for December 1992 to made the index 
comparable across oblasts as well as over time.
I then use CPI19jt to deflate nominal levels of transfers for each oblast i 
for each year t, to get levels of each variable in 1991 prices, adjusted by 
the oblast coefficient, i.e.:
TRANSit = NOMTRANSit / CPI19it
where NOMTRANSjt is the nominal level of subventions in oblast 
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